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Gardner’s second case study covers the
period from mid-1942 to mid-1943, the
final turning point in the campaign.
Once again, he makes a strong argument
that factors other than ULTRA were es-
sential for the Allies’ success, most im-
portantly the closing of the mid-Atlantic
“air gap” and the increasing number and
effectiveness of Allied escort vessels. By
1943, Gardner notes, it was more hazard-
ous than ever for the Germans to attack
convoys. At the same time, the growing
number of U-boats operating in the
mid-Atlantic made the evasive routing of
convoys extremely difficult for the Allies,
even when ULTRA was available on a
timely basis.
These case studies cover periods when
ULTRA was most valuable because Ger-
many was employing its U-boats in “wolf
pack” attacks on convoys. When U-boats
operated individually rather than in
groups, which was the case for nearly
two-thirds of the war, ULTRA’s value was
much less. Gardner also emphasizes that
there were lengthy periods when German
signals were being read only after consid-
erable delay. For much of the war, he
concludes, ULTRA’s principal use was to
enable the Allies to build up a general
picture of the size and methods of the
German U-boat fleet. It seldom had any
impact on the Battle of the Atlantic at the
operational or tactical levels.
This book deliberately focuses on the
turning points of the campaign and the
broad relationship of ULTRA to other fac-
tors; it does not provide either a
blow-by-blow account of the Battle of the
Atlantic or a systematic examination of
ULTRA’s employment by Allied com-
manders. The period from June 1943 un-
til the end of the war is largely ignored.
However, Gardner devotes a considerable
portion of this book to background
information about the Battle of the At-
lantic, including the importance of eco-
nomic factors, the role of technology,
Germany’s own code-breaking activities,
and the workings of convoy. This mate-
rial should be useful for the general
reader even if it offers little for the
specialist.
Gardner’s broad conclusions are carefully
reasoned and well balanced. The Battle of
the Atlantic would have been a harder
and costlier struggle without ULTRA, but
the Allied victory cannot be solely attrib-
uted to code-breaking successes. Decoding
History will not be the final word on sig-
nals intelligence and the Battle of the At-
lantic, but it may put an end to the wildly
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There are few untold stories left from
World War II, but the actions of the
Royal Navy’s Coastal Forces can be de-
scribed as little known and unappreci-
ated. Serving in small plywood craft
much like the more famous American PT
boats, the Coastal Forces wreaked havoc
with Axis forces in British and foreign
waters. Operating from small harbors
and primitive forward bases, theirs was a
war of small, close-knit crews and close
action with the enemy. They did it all,
from convoy escort to shipping interdic-
tion, clandestine landings to reconnais-
sance operations, and finally, distant
screening for invasion forces. Coastal
Forces were a ubiquitous presence in the
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European theater. Wherever there were
Axis forces in coastal waters or areas, the
Royal Navy dispatched Coastal Forces to
counter them. Yet strangely, little has
been published about these deadly
fast-attack craft and their courageous
crews. Dog Boats at War redresses some
of that shortfall in naval literature.
Written by a wartime motor gunboat
commander, Leonard C. Reynolds, this
book tells the Coastal Forces’ story with
an authenticity that can only be pro-
duced by one who was there. Reynolds
focuses on the actions that took place
during his service in 1942–45, and on the
class of boat in which he served, the
Fairmile D-class motor-torpedo and mo-
tor gunboat (MTB and MGB, respec-
tively). The title, Dog Boats at War, is
derived from the nickname given to the
rather blunt-looking Fairmile fast-attack
craft.
The Royal Navy entered World War II
with two flotillas of underpowered
MTBs. They proved woefully inadequate
against the German Schnellbooten and
Italian MAS torpedo boats. The Admi-
ralty tasked Noel Macklin of Fairmile to
develop a fast-attack boat to compete
with the enemy boats. Macklin’s design
was ready by March 1941 and was put
into production six months later after a
rushed but successful testing program.
The first boats entered service in the Eng-
lish Channel by early spring 1942. Ori-
ginally intended as motor gunboats for
convoy escort, they were converted to
torpedo boats while under construction.
Equipped with two twenty-one-inch tor-
pedo tubes instead of a six-pounder can-
non, the MTBs proved very effective at
intercepting German convoys transiting
off the Dutch and French coasts.
The “dog boat” was a simple and robust
design, but its performance was not
extraordinary. Its 115-foot hull had a
blunt semi-hard-chine design and used
four Packard 1,250-horsepower engines
to achieve a maximum speed of
thirty-two knots—some five knots slower
than its German or American counter-
parts. The dog boats were also small in
comparison to their opponents but rode
better in a seaway. Their superior stabil-
ity often proved decisive in the rough wa-
ters of the English Channel and off the
Norwegian coast. In the end, however, it
was the crews that made the difference.
It took a special kind of sailor to man a
plywood boat filled with five thousand
gallons of highly volatile aviation gaso-
line. The Royal Navy found their early
crews among the yachtsmen, racing en-
thusiasts, and fishermen who populated
Britain’s coastal towns and villages.
These early recruits shaped the force that
followed. The dog boats went to war with
small crews of thirty to thirty-two men
commanded by young Royal Navy Vol-
unteer Reserve officers, many drawn
from the Commonwealth. The com-
manding officers were generally in their
twenties, and most had at least two years
of experience in fast-attack craft. The
crews were also either reservists or “war-
time only” ratings. The average age of the
crewmen was between eighteen and nine-
teen, with perhaps one career regular
petty officer on board to provide experi-
ence. The result was a tightly knit, young,
and aggressive crew—ideally suited to the
unconventional fighting that character-
ized warfare in fast-attack craft. Survival
depended on the commander’s judgment
and the crew’s teamwork. It was a suc-
cessful formula that served the boats well
from Norway to the eastern
Mediterranean.
The Royal Navy’s Coastal Forces oper-
ated in a style not unlike that of light
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forces of the Napoleonic era. Some of the
actions described here are worthy of the
best adventure fiction. Many boats ran
agents, supplies, and weapons to the un-
derground forces resisting Nazi occupa-
tion. For example, the 30th MTB
Flotilla’s boats often hid in caves along
the Norwegian fjords or crept along dark
“leads,” dodging German patrols while
seeking contacts and recruits among the
occupied population. MTBs carried the
kidnapped German general Werner
Kreipe off Crete and transported him to
Egypt for interrogation. They also played
a deadly game of hide and seek with the
Axis navies and the Luftwaffe in the
Aegean Sea and among Yugoslavia’s
coastal islands. Wherever they served, the
dog boats were the force of choice for en-
gaging the enemy closely—and they paid
dearly for it, losing 273 officers and men
killed in action.
Some 228 dog boats were built between
November 1941 and April 1945. They
fought in over three hundred actions,
sinking and damaging innumerable Axis
vessels while losing some thirty-seven of
their own. On the basis of eight years of
research in official records and interview-
ing people involved, Reynolds has com-
piled as complete and accurate a record
of the dog boats’ actions as humanly pos-
sible. Dog Boats at War is a brilliant, if
occasionally dry, treatment of an impor-
tant and all but ignored part of the Royal
Navy’s history in World War II. It is
worth its price, and I hope it will be fol-
lowed by similar works on the Coastal
Forces’ other elements.
CARL OTIS SCHUSTER
Captain, U.S. Navy, Retired
Sailua, Hawaii
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The Navy has had a remarkable and pro-
ductive group of in-house research and
development laboratories. Sadly, with the
drawdowns of the post–Cold War era,
many have been closed, among them the
“White Oak Laboratory”—the Naval
Ordnance Laboratory at White Oak,
Maryland. WOL, as it was popularly
known, gave the Navy a tremendous leg-
acy of technology, weapons, and people.
Fortunately, that legacy has been pre-
served by William Anspacher, Betty Gay,
Donald Marlowe, Paul Morgan, and
Samuel Raff in this richly detailed ac-
count of the laboratory’s history.
First, the required disclaimer: this reviewer
spent twenty years of his midcareer with
WOL. And good years they were.
The laboratory was built in 1946 in what
was then remote suburban Maryland,
where ordnance testing would presum-
ably not disturb the neighbors. It was an
outgrowth of the Mine Building at the
Washington Navy Yard, and mine devel-
opment was the core of its original work.
From it came the Navy’s postwar mines:
the Mark 50 series, CAPTOR, the subma-
rine-launched mobile mine, and the De-
structor series.
In 1948, high-mach-number wind tun-
nels captured at Peenemunde, Germany,
were installed at WOL and became oper-
ational. With these, the laboratory began
a new line of technological development
for the Navy. From those first tunnels
grew a series of hypersonic wind tunnels
that gave engineers the ability to test re-
entry vehicles at speeds up to Mach 14.
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